Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Dan Pearson v. South Jordan Employee Appeals
Board : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Camille N. Johnson; Judith D. Wolferts; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Respondent.
Gregory G. Skordas; Chad D. Noakes; Skordas, Caston & Hyde; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Dan Pearson v. South Jordan Employee Appeals Board, No. 20070378 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/227

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAN PEARSON,
Petitioner,
Appellate Case No. 20070378
vs.
SOUTH JORDAN,
Respondent.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

Attorneys for Petitioner
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
Chad D.Noakes (#11937)
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE
341 South Main Street, Ste. 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Respondent
Camille N. Johnson (#5494)
Judith D. Wolferts (#7023)

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN, & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
"WHAPPaUTE COURTS

"ECO 5

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAN PEARSON,
Petitioner,
Appellate Case No. 20070378
vs.

SOUTH JORDAN,
Respondent.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

Attorneys for Petitioner
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
Chad D.Noakes (#11937)
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE
341 South Main Street, Ste. 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Respondent
Camille N. Johnson (#5494)
Judith D. Wolferts (#7023)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN, & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

ARGUMENT

4

1.

2.

3.

4.

Respondent's Anti-Jurisdictional Argument Misconstrues
Mr. Pearson's Claims And The Court's Decision To
Reinstate The Appeal

4

Respondent's Marshalling Argument Inaccurately States
The Issues On Appeal And Fails To Recognize The
Insufficiency Of Its Own Findings

7

Respondent Interprets Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 To
Advance Its Own Agenda While Ignoring The Statute's
Plain Language

10

Respondent's New Contract Argument Does Not Overcome Its
Erroneous Statutory Interpretation And Failure To Consider
Mr. Pearson's Contract Claim Before Issuing Its Decision

12

CONCLUSION

13

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

13

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35

7, 8

Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384

7, 8

Lee v. Frank's Garage and Used Cars, 2007 UT APP 260, 97 P.3d 717

5

Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193

7

State v. Lovegren, 708 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

8

United Park City Mines v. Sticking Mayflower Mountain, 2006 UT 35, 140
P.3dl200
9
Utah County v. Alexanderson, 2003 UT APP 153,71 P.3d621

7

Utah Pub. Employees Ass 'nv. State, 2006 UT 9, 131 P.3d208

10

Whitear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
Woodard v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

7
7, 8

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105

4-13

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106

4-13

Rules
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 10

3

6, 7

ARGUMENT
L

RESPONDENT'S ANTI-JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT
MISCONSTRUES MR. PEARSON'S CLAIMS AND THE
COURT'S DECISION TO REINSTATE THE APPEAL.

Petitioner's opening brief ("Brief') provides a clear basis for this Court's
jurisdiction and observes that the Court has already decided in favor of hearing the
appeal. See Pet'r Init. Br., p. 1. Mr. Pearson will not belabor the issue, but will alert
the Court of the inconsistencies and misstatements that form the basis of
Respondent's argument.
First, Respondent attempts to limit this Court's jurisdiction by stating as
conclusive the finding disputed on appeal - that Mr. Pearson was an at-will
employee. Respondent acknowledges that the Court "has subject matter jurisdiction
under § 10-3-1106 to review the actual discharge . . . of an employee who is not atwill," but argues that Mr. Pearson, who is in fact appealing his discharge on the
basis that he is not at-will, does not qualify for review. Resp. Br., p. 29. The only
way to reconcile these two statements is to view the "not at-will" requirement as
being one decided by the responding party, as if the statute were to read: "an
employee who is not at-will in the opinion of respondent" This approach is
inaccurate. Where jurisdiction hinges upon a fact in dispute, the Petitioner's prima
facie claim is controlling until the court makes a final determination. See Lee v.
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Frank's Garage & Used Cars, Inc., 97 P.3d 717, 719, n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
Here, Mr. Pearson's employment status is the core question before the Court and
cannot be determined without full consideration on the merits.
Adding to Respondent's inconsistency is the fact that Rule 4-08(4)(c) of
South Jordan City Employee Policy specifically states that Mr. Pearson may appeal
Respondent's determinations to this Court. See R. 152. While the internal rule is
not controlling, it shows that Respondent previously reviewed the jurisdictional
statutes and determined that this Court has jurisdiction to review its decisions.
Thus, Respondent argues that its legal interpretations are beyond review while
simultaneously arguing that its policies misstate the law.
Next, Respondent states that Mr. Pearson has "pursued his appeal to the
Appeals Board as a grievance of his status, not as a grievance of the propriety of his
discharge." Resp. Br. p. 29. This argument ignores that, under the present
circumstances, these challenges are the same. Mr. Pearson is appealing the
propriety of his discharge, which was based completely on his employment status.
See Pet'r Init. Br., p. 11. But for Respondent's finding that he was at-will, he
would not have been discharged.
Similarly, Respondent incorrectly interprets Mr. Pearson's alternative
argument. Mr. Pearson argues that if his position is among those excluded from the
5

statute, it simply means that the statute is irrelevant and does not dictate any
employment status, leaving Respondent free to offer him full merit employment.
See Id. at pp. 12-13. Respondent inaccurately restates this argument as being that
"even if Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 did not apply to him so that he was at-will
under the statute, he was removed from statutory at-will status by an express or
implied-in-fact employment agreement." Resp. Br. p. 28 (emphasis added).
Respondent's jurisdictional arguments do not have merit where they repeatedly
misstate the issues and law to its advantage.
Finally, Respondent argues that the Court has not made any decision
regarding jurisdiction, stating that the Court's June 18, 2008 Orders (R. 32, 34)
should be viewed as merely "acknowledging the district court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction." Id. at p. 27. This argument fails to recognize that the Court
fully reinstated the case and has proceeded with briefing. The Court reviewed all
aspects of the jurisdictional argument, including the arguments made in the Petition
for Permission to Appeal and its own jurisdictional analysis prior to the initial
transfer. R. 32, 34. Had the Court determined that neither court had jurisdiction, it
would have simply granted the interlocutory appeal and dismissed the action
pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Ut. R. App. P.
10(e) ("The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as it directs, may
6

dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks jurisdiction.").
II.

RESPONDENT'S MARSHALLING ARGUMENT
INACCURATELY STATES THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE INSUFFICIENCY
OF ITS OWN FINDINGS.

Marshalling the evidence "is not, itself, a rule of substantive law." Martinez
v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42,f19; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). It is a tool
crafted to ease the Court's burden in assessing the weight of factual evidence, i.e.
determining whether "the [factual] findings are supported by substantial evidence."
Whitear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Questions of
law do not require marshalling because no deference is given to the findings below.
See Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 7, f 7 ("Marshalling requirement applies only to
challenges of factual findings, not conclusions of law."); Utah County v.
Alexanderson, 2003 UT APP 153, \ 8 (mistakes of law are reviewed under a
correctness standard). The Court must determine the correct rule of law as intended
by the legislature.
The marshalling requirement is triggered where the fact finder sets forth
findings sufficient to facilitate a "meaningful review of the decision's evidentiary
basis." Woodardv. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "The findings
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Armed
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Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^f 28 (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Where "the findings are not of that caliber, appellant need not
go through a futile marshalling exercise" because "meaningful review of a
decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible." Fazzio at 477 (citing State v.
Lovegren, 708 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Respondent's decision is far from the formal findings of fact and conclusions
of law typically issued by trial courts and required to trigger the marshalling
requirement. Indeed, Respondent's final decision is a lifeless one sentence
statement: "The Board determined that Mr. Pearson was an 'at-will' employee." R.
21.
It would be impossible for Mr. Pearson to review the decision's evidentiary
basis or play "devil's advocate," let alone "ferret out a fatal flaw" in the evidence.
Martinez at \ 17. Respondent's one sentence finding has put the Court "in the
awkward position of having to speculate about what [Respondent] actually
determined the facts to be without the benefit of the guidance that proper factual
findings are meant to provide." Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 478, n.7
Irrespective of the decision's shortcomings, the issue before this court is
"whether the South Jordan Employee Appeals Board misinterpreted] Utah Code
Ann. §10-3-1105 and erroneously conclude[d] that Daniel Pearson was an at-will
8

employee." See Pet'r Ink. Br. p. 7. The case hinges on whether § 10-3-1105
mandates the at-will status of an Assistant Police Chief. This case it is not
"extremely fact-intensive" as required to trigger the marshalling requirement
because the only determinative fact, Mr. Pearson's job title, is not in dispute. United
Park City Mines v. Sticking Mayflower Mountain, 2006 UT 35, ^f 25.
In his Brief, Mr. Pearson rebuts any argument that other facts, such as Mr.
Pearson's job description, are relevant to the statutory analysis:
Respondent relies on Mr. Pearson's job description as evidence that he
was the equivalent of a deputy police chief. This position disregards
Respondent's duty to observe Utah's title specific statutory scheme. A
job description cannot change the position's title where the title has
legal significance under the Utah Code. Both parties agree that Mr.
Pearson's title was Assistant Police Chief.
Pet'r Init. Br. at p. 9 (emphasis added).
Mr. Pearson's alternative argument is based on another undisputed fact: that
the Appeals Board never evaluated the evidence of a merit employee contract
because the case was decided on superseding grounds - that the statute mandated
his at-will status. See Resp. Br. P. 28 ("Utah Code Ann. § 10-5-1105 did not apply
to hi so that he was at-will under the statute . . . statutorily at-will."
Mr. Pearson's Brief does rebut the argument that his job description was the
same as would be expected of a Deputy Police Chief. Id. at pp. 9-10. He also states
that Mr. Pearson had a merit employee contract. Id. at p. 14. These statements do
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not change the issues on appeal or transform Mr. Pearson's argument into a factual
one. Mr. Pearson's request remains that the Court review Respondent's
interpretations of law as applied to the undisputed facts.
While Mr. Pearson believes the Court could go as far as to order Mr.
Pearson's reinstatement, he acknowledges that the most likely relief is to "remand
the matter back to the Appeals Board for review in accordance with the correct
interpretations of law." Id. at 15, n.3.
III.

RESPONDENT INTERPRETS UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 10-3-1105 TO ADVANCE ITS OWN AGENDA WHILE
IGNORING THE STATUTE'S PLAIN LANGUAGE.

Respondent's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 claims that the
statute's plain language is too ambiguous to be taken at face value. Resp. Br. p. 34
As Respondent acknowledges, the Court should "not look beyond the [statute's]
plain language" unless it "finds some ambiguity in it." Resp. Br. p. 34; Utah Pub.
Employee Ass 'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ^f 59. In attempting to find such ambiguity,
Respondent ignores the statute's clear distinction between an assistant and deputy
and applies a new standard not discussed anywhere in the statute - whether the
position involves "policy-making." Resp. Br. p. 35
Determining whether a statute's language is ambiguous "depends not only on
the text of the particular provision at issue, but also on the text of the statute as a
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whole." Utah Pub. Employees at f 60. In this case, the statute makes a specific
distinction between deputies and assistants:
(d) a deputy police chief of a municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (emphasis added).
The legislature would not have placed "or assistant" into the statute were the
two positions identical. If the distinction was inserted for mere clarification (i.e., to
make sure the reader understands that deputy includes assistants), it would have
made a similar statement in reference to deputy police chiefs. The inclusion of
"assistants" in referencing fire chiefs but not police chiefs demonstrates that the
exclusion of assistant police chiefs was intentional.
Respondent claims that public policy supports inclusion of assistant police
chiefs. Resp. Br. p. 35. The more important policy consideration is that an
individual be given notice of whether or not his or her position is covered under §
10-3-1105. Respondent's view requires an assistant police chief to guess that the
legislature was referring to assistants as well as deputies, even though it treats them
differently in the context of fire departments.
Moreover, Respondent's claim that "the legislature intends only to protect the
jobs of employees who are not in policy-making positions" is unsupported. Resp.
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Br. p. 35. The legislature gave municipalities the authority to exclude certain
employees from the protections of § 10-3-1105 by assigning the employee a job
title specifically listed. If it meant to do so, Respondent should have conformed
Mr. Pearson's job title to the statute, instead of expecting it to work the other way
around.
IV.

RESPONDENT'S NEW CONTRACT ARGUMENT
CANNOT OVERCOME ITS ERRONEOUS STATUTURY
INTERPRETATION OR FAILURE TO CONSIDER MR.
PEARSON'S CONTRACT CLAIM BEFORE ISSUING ITS
DECISION.

Respondent erroneously interprets the statute as removing the ability of
municipalities to give excluded positions any type of protected or merit status. See
Resp. Br. P. 28 ("Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 did not apply to him so that he was
at-will under the statute . . . statutorily at will."). With this belief, the Employee
Appeals Board did not consider the existence of a merit employment contract and
did not address the argument in its one sentence decision. It had already determined
that Mr. Pearson, due to his job title, was statutorily required to be at-will.
Respondent avoids discussing its statutory interpretation by citing contract
law and arguing that there was no express or implied-in-fact agreement. This
discussion comes too late. Respondent cannot now makeup for what it did not do at
the hearing. If there is a debatable factual issue as to whether Respondent and Mr.
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Pearson had a merit employment contract, the Court must remand the case back to
the Appeals Board for review applying the correct interpretations of law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing arguments, Mr. Pearson respectfully requests that this
Court overturn his termination and grant appropriate relief as requested
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Respondent has requested oral argument in this matter. Petitioner agrees that
oral argument is appropriate.
Dated this , S

day of December, 2008.
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE

^ri&.
Chad D. Noakes
Attorney for Petitioner

13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the f
day of December, 2008,1 hand delivered
two (2) true and correct copies of PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF to the
following:

Camille N. Johnson
Judith D. Wolferts
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

